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Abstract 
The Court of Italian Cassation with the ordinance of June 6 th 2013, n. 14323 put 
again to the Italian Constitutional Court the decision on the case of a couple of consorts 
whose transsexual husband had gotten the rectification of attribution of sex. 
The controversial joint concernes the fate of the marriage tie following the change of sex of 
one the consorts. 
Besides the annotation on the action of birth of the variation of the registry data there was the 
annotation related automatic cessation of marriage. 
The Court of Italian Cassation admits that a form is created of “imposed divorce”. To the 
light of this it is legitimate the doubt the vompatibilities with the normative constitutional and 
with the contained prescriptions in the CEDU, in which he affirms the right of self-
determination in the relative choices personal and sexual ball’identita of every individual. 
The Court of Italian constitution, also recognizing importance to the homosexual unions, it 
exclusively interprets the marriage among heterosexual. 
Keywords: Divorce imposed, marriage, transsexual, unconstitutional 
 
Introduction 
 This articledraws ona case that hascreated, inItaly, a heated debateby introducing a 
kindof "forced divorce" as a resultof the change ofsexby oneof the spouses.This is dueto the 
absence oflegislation which,like othercountriesof the European Union, rules, 
unionsbetweenindividuals of the samegender. 
 The couple, eager to maintainthemarried state, have turned tocivil Courtof 
Modenabecauseherecognizedtheir rightto family life. 
 The question isthenarrived at theItalian Court of Cassationdecided thatfor the 
referralto the Constitutional Court, through, interalia, theviolationof various provisionsof the 
Italian Constitution. 
 This rulingisan opportunity to examinethelegislation and case lawon the subject 
ofEuropeanunionandfamily. 
 
I. 
 The circumstances that give rise to the hypothesis imposed divorce starts from the 
automatic termination of the marriage bond as a result of the adjustment of sex allocation of 
one of the spouses-authorized by the Court of Bologna in Art.4 of Act 164 of 198286 and Art. 
31 of d.l. n. 150/201187. According to these rules, the judicial authority welcoming the 
request for rectification of gender requires the registrar of the municipality of registration of 
                                                          
86 Legge 14.4.1982, no. 164, ”Norme in materia di rettificazione e attribuzione di sesso”, G.U. 19.4.1982, no. 
106. 
87 D.lgs. 1.9.2011 no. 150, “Disposizioni complementari al c.p.c. in materia di riduzione e semplificazione 
dei procedimenti civili di cognizione, ai sensi della legge 18.6.2009, n. 69”, G.U. 21.9.2011, no. 220.  
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birth certificate, changing the relevant register; this adjustment results in the dissolution of 
marriage and the cessation of the civil effects-as dictated by Art. 4 of Law n. 164/1982 and 
Art. 31 of d.l. n. 150/2011- to note in the margin of the marriage (Presidential Decree no. 
396/2000, Art. 6988). 
 The married couple has appealed to the Court of Modena requesting the correction of 
the act and obtaining a favorable ruling, but despite the acceptance of the request, the Italian 
Ministry of Interior denied the required correction believing that would lead to maintain “life 
in a relationship devoid of its essential premise of legitimacy, namely the sexual diversity of 
spouses”. 
 The Court of Appeal of Bologna, to which the Italian Ministry of the Interior has 
proposed complaint, argues the legitimacy of the record made by the Registrar.  
 The courts of appeal, rule on the matter, have justified the decision by highlighting the 
complementarity between the update cd master-name in the feminine-and updating the 
registers of civil status; with the mutation registry, according to the Court of Appeal of 
Bologna, would fail the assumption characterizing the marriage union identifiable in sexual 
diversity between spouses. Emerges from the judgment the "necessity" of a causal link 
between gender and the rectification of the record that the registrar completes about the 
cessation of the civil effects of marriage.  
 Spouses propose, therefore, appeal to the Italian Supreme Court which, by the order 
of 6 June 2013, n. 14329, suspends judgment of the same object and decides for the 
transmission of documents to the Constitutional Court. With sentence no. 170 on 11 June 
201489, the Italian Constitutional Court has expressed itself by stating that the divorce 
"imposed" the married couple, one of whom has obtained the correction of the attribution of 
sex, is unconstitutional. However, refer to the legislature the task of providing a legal 
framework, which currently does not exist. The note highlights the positive aspects and 
critical judgment, placing it within a lively academic debate started in Italy in recent years.  
 The Supreme Court of Italyrepents in the judicial decision of the lower court a kind of 
"forced divorce" by the legislature for the following reasons: the institution of marriage is 
based on the consensus that must be used in all matters that concern them; the dissolution of 
marriage was not, in this case we are discussing, the subject of pronunciation by a judicial 
authority and therefore not the principles of public policy concerning the institution referred 
to in Law no. 898/1970; the constraint has arisen previously with respect to the choice of 
gender reassignment. 
 Self-determination is the basis of the choices belonging to the emotional and affective 
sphere of the person concerned, in this case, in addition to the deprivation of a fundamental 
right which is already-acquired-inevitably affects the spouse who is disturbed state90. In this 
case there is a cancellation of already acquired a status that can not be superimposed on the 
prohibition of marriage between same-sex spouses. In regard to the latter there is an 
unjustified equation of already married people who choose to change sex and homosexual 
persons wishing to contract marriage thus causing an assimilation between gender identity 
and sexual orientation, already clearly distinguished by the Constitutional Court91.  
                                                          
88 D.P.R. 3.11.2000, no. 396, “Regolamento per la revisione e la semplificazione dell’ordinamento dello 
stato civile, a norma dell’art. 2, comma 12, dell’art. 54 della L. 15 maggio 1997, n. 127”, G.U. 30.12.2000, 
no. 303. 
89 Constitutional Court of italy, 11.06.2014 n. 170,www.cortecostituzionale.it 
90TheLaw no.164/1982, as pointed out in the judgmentof the Constitutional Courtno.161of 1985,has accepteda 
precisedefinition ofsexual identityby claiming that"for the purposesofsuch an identificationis 
givenmoreimportance notonly tothe external genitalia,as establishedat the time ofbirth(..), but also to elements 
ofpsychologicalandsocial”. 
91 Constitutional Court of Italy, 23 marzo 2010, n. 138, inG.U. 21 aprile 2010. 
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 From these considerations reveal the doubts of compatibility between the provisions 
of Art. 4 of Law n. 164/1982 with the Constitution and with the principles contained in the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.  
 The Supreme Court of Italy, in the grounds of the order, draws on several occasions 
human rights allegedly violated by the above mentioned article; the reference, in particular, is 
addressed in Articles. 6, 8, 12, and 14 of the ECHR and Articles. 7, 9, 20 and 21 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
 Valuating the profiles of European Union law, however, is should be noted that in the 
present case are not applicable provisions of law of the EU, mainly for two reasons: firstly 
because the spouses Italian citizens no element boundaries; in addition, the EU, under the 
circumstances, has no specific expertise on the approval of binding acts in the field of family 
law. This "gap" has been filled by the various national legislatures that govern the relations of 
family traits with transnational through the rules of substantive law, the rules of private 
international law and procedural law. 
 The ECHR, that in the hierarchy of sources, ranks among the constitutional provisions 
and the common law rule which cd "intermediaries"92 - as part of the catalog of rights 
includes two provisions expressly dedicated to the protection of the family is of Art. 8 and 12.  
 The  EuropeanCharter of Fundamental Rights93 - which is of the same legal value as 
the Treaties Art. 6 TEU94- recognizes the importance of family, social primary education, 
pledging to protect the right of establishment and preservation of family relationships. It 
should also be pointed out that, from an analysis of the holders of the rights recognized in the 
Charter, the family is not considered as such-as is the case for other social formations-but it is 
taken into account "in mediated pathway" as a collective projection rights that are still 
conceived as individual95.  
 Despite starting from the assumption that it is appropriate to point out that, in the 
catalog of the rights recognized by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, there are 
several provisions related-albeit indirectly-the protection of the family96. With reference 
toprovisions of the Charterdevotedto the family, there was the"fragmentation" of the 
designcircuit,from which itemergesin full "the family as a community,"losingthat "connoted 
aggregating"that should be“theintimate bondbetweendispositionshereinsteadare 
scatteredbetween equality, freedom, solidarity”97. 
                                                          
92As establishedby the rulings ofthe Constitutional Court no. 348of 24 October2007 and n. 349of 24 October 
2007. Suchpronunciations, called "judgments twins,"governing the relationship betweenthe ECHR andthe 
Italian legal systemby comparing theway toposethe relations betweenthe EUregulationsandtheinternal order, L. 
GAROFALO, Obblighiinternazionali e funzionelegislativa, Torino, 2009. 
93Proclaimedfor the first time, December 7th, 2000bythe European Parliament, Commission and Council in 
Nice; proclaimed for the second time inDecember 12, 2007in Strasbourg.The Charterhas not been includedin the 
Treaty ofNicewas signed on 26February 2001entered into force on1 February 2001,in GUCE C 80 of 10 march 
2001. 
94N. PARISI Funzione e ruolo della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea nel sistema delle fonti 
alla luce del Trattato di Lisbona, in Il diritto dell’Unione europea, fasc. 3, 2009, p. 653; F. CAGGIA, Famiglia 
e diritti fondamentali nel sistema dell’Unione europea, Roma, 2005. 
95 Cfr. R. BIFULCO, M. CARTABIA, A. CELOTTO, L’Europa dei diritti. Commento alla Carta dei diritti 
fondamentali dell’Unione europea, Bologna, 2011, p. 15. 
96In particular,observethat Article. 7, dedicatedto respect forprivate and family life; Article. 9, whichguarantees 
the rightto marry andto found a family; Article. 14, whichestablishes the rightof parents tochoosethe education 
and trainingof their childrenin conformity with theirreligious, philosophical andpedagogical skills;Article. 23, 
whichaffirms the rightofequality betweenmen and women;Article. 24concerning the rightsof the child;Article. 
25, concerning the rightsof the elderly;Article. 26on the rights ofpeople with disabilities;Article. 33, which 
establishes thegeneralprotectionof thefamily shall enjoy legal, economic and social. 
97F.D. BUSNELLI, Importanza e limiti dei valori fondamentali della Carta europea, in G. VETTORI (edited 
by), Carta europea e diritti dei privati, Padova, 2002, p.  133. 
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 Tohave a clearregulatory framework forself-determinationand the protection 
offamilyprivacy, guaranteedby the European legislator, it is appropriate thata combined 
readingof Art. 8 and 12 ofthe ECHRby Art.9 of the Charterof Fundamental Rightsof the EU. 
At the time thetext of the Conventionwas drafted, the expression "family life" in Art.8ECHR, 
it was probably relatedto the lifewithin the familybased on marriage 
betweenheterosexuals.The association, within thatarticle,the privacyof family life, on the 
other hand, hintedon the basis ofonlytextual datathat art. 8wasdesigned specificallytoprotect 
theindividual's rightto respect for hisfamily life. 
 Art.8notes at theend of the configurationof aright to family reunificationas well asthe 
protection ofrespect for family life, private lifeand correspondence98; 
Art.2addressestheprotectionof therightto marryand founda family, andasArt. 7of 
theCharterofFundamentalRightsof the EuropeanUnion,therighttorespectforhis familylife 
isstructuredas arightof theindividual99. 
 Taken as a whole, the provision in question is confined to enshrine respect for the 
right of the "family life", as well as the "private life", without committing itself to provide a 
definition of both expressions.  In particular, wishing to proceed to the identification of the 
definition of family life, in order to assess how the union will fall even when one spouse 
chooses to change sex, can not pay due heed to the fact that the text of the agreement 
dedicate, with Art. 12, a specific provision of the right to marry and found a family.  
 To contextualize the dictates Art. 8 and Art. 12 of the ECHR is required reading 
combined with the art. 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights that affirmed the right of the 
individual to marriage and the establishment of a family, it offers protection to forms of union 
other than heterosexual. This systems from the postponement of some principles to the 
legislation of each Member in accordance with the awareness of the diversity of cultures that 
determine the structure of protection, in particular, of an ethical nature100. 
                                                          
M. DE SALVIA, Compendium della CEDU. Le linee guida della giurisprudenza relativa alla Convenzione 
europea dei diritti dell’uomo, Napoli, 2000, p. 203 ss.; V. ZENO ZENIVICH,  Art. 8, Diritto al rispetto della 
vita privata e familiare, in S. BARTOLE, B. CONFORTI, G. RAIMONDI, Commentario alla Convenzione 
europea per la tutela dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali, Padova, 2001, p. 307 ss.; C. RUSSO, art 
8 § 1, in L.E. PETTITI, E. DECAUX, P.H. IMBERT, La Convention Européennedesdroits de l’homme, 
Commentairearticle par article, Parigi, 1995, p. 305 ss.; F. G. JACOBS, R.C.A. WHITE, The European 
Convention on Human Rights, Oxford, 2006, IV ed., p. 241 ss.; P. VAN DIJK, J.H. GODEFRIDUS HOOF, 
G.J.H. VAN HOOF, Theory and practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, The Hague, 1998; C. 
PRAVANI, art. 8 Diritto al rispetto della vita privata efamiliare, in C. DEFILIPPI, D. BOSI, R. HARVEY 
(edited by), La Convenzione Europea dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali, Napoli, 2006, p. 291 ss.; 
V. BERGER Jurisprudence de la CourEuropéennedesdroits de l’homme, XI ed., Parigi, 2009. 
99 Cfr. V. ZAGREBELSKY, Famiglia e vita familiare nella Convenzione europea dei diritti umani, in M.C. 
ANDRINI (edited by), Un nuovo diritto di famiglia europeo, Padova, 2007, p. 115 ss.The authorpoints outthe 
prospectart.8is different from thatexpressedby art.29of the Italian Constitution, where the reference pointof the 
rights recognized(though not expressed) is directly the family as asocial formationandthat, if anything,is the 
structure ofart.2of the Constitution whichis close to thatart.8 of the Convention. Does not,in fact, the text of an 
articlesimilarconventionalart.16, par.3of the Universal Declarationof Human Rights, according to which: “the 
family is thenatural and fundamental unitofsociety and is entitledto protectionby society and theState”.G. 
OBERTO, La tutela dei diritti fondamentali nelle Corte costituzionali, ovvero del difficile dialogo tra Carte e 
Corti, in Ildiritto di famiglia e delle persone, 2013, fasc. 1, p. 221. 
100The consistencyof the principle ofnational reservewas confirmed by theConstitutional Courtin 
thecit.Nojudgment. 138/2010aboutsame-sex marriage, which states: <<purposes of thisdecisionit should be 
notedthat Article. 9 of the Charter, affirming theright to marryrefers to thenational lawsgoverning the 
exercise>>. Sameorientationfollows theECtHR, SchalkandKopfc. Austria, June 24, 2010, application no. 
30141/04, the case comes from theuseof twoAustrian citizens, whose marriage proposalwas not acceptedby the 
national authorities(pursuant to art.44 of theAustrian Civil Code) andrejected by theAustrian Constitutional 
Court. The Strasbourg Court, in this case, denies that art. 12 of the Conventionon theright to marry,could be 
extendedto homosexual couplesbut recognizesan entitlementto theright to family life, protectedin any caseart.8 
of the Convention. 
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 The interpretation of Art. 12ECHR in "conjunction" with the Art. 9 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU, made by the Court of Human Rights, led to the conclusion 
that the legislature of the Charter has deliberately avoided reference to the men and 
women101. This presumption is confirmed by commentary on the paper which is made 
explicit in the broader Art. In relation to Articles 9, 12 of the Convention (even allowing for a 
margin of discretion to the member which is responsible for the regular forms of union). 
 In short, the right to marriage, in the light of the above, read together, including same-
sex marriage.  
 The Court of Human Rights, on the occasion of the individual cases brought to its 
attention, took care to highlight the wide borders and to define the scope102of the notions of 
"private life" and "family life"103recognizing protection to a number of rights that, in 
hindsight, are not immediate correspondence in the wording of the provision, and that appear 
to be the result of a progressive path punctuated evolutionary interpretation of the treaty text. 
 The European Court of Human Rights has assigned to the concept of an independent 
value family life with a much broader scope of the relationship based solely on marriage. The 
existence of a marriage determines almost automatically, the affirmation of the existence of a 
"family life".  
 The jurisprudence of the Court has been particularly focused on the notion of 
"interference" and the provision of Art. 8 ECHR has given rise to an abundant case law that, 
by applying a plurality of their exegetical methods of the Convention, has a limited set of 
"european standards" for the protection of the family104. The analysis of the case law on Art. 
8 of the ECHR, it is clear, first that, by using the theory of "positive obligations", the 
Strasbourg Court has added an outright prohibition of "interference" in the respect of private 
and family life enshrined in the wording of the provision required for States to adopt 
measures concerning the promotion and the protection of that sphere from attacks by private 
entities105. 
 The Strasbourg Court has ruled on several occasions106 about the rights of 
transsexuals condemning those Contracting States which unjustifiably infringe the rights 
related to privacy of the individual. In its judgment H. c. Finland107, the ECHR considers not 
disproportionate imposition of the finnish legislation against the applicant who requested that 
the full recognition the new sex, with the explicit assignment of a social security number of 
women, it was not conditional on the conversion of his marriage with a woman in a registered 
partnership. Therefore, it is not considered detrimental to Art. 8 ECHR, the "downgrading" of 
                                                          
101 v. Schalk e Kopf c. Austria, cit. 
102With particular referenceto the notion of"family life" in doctrine hasemphasized thechallenges connected 
withcasuisticapproachandoftennon-unitaryadoptedby the Strasbourg Court.L. DE GRAZIA, Il diritto al rispetto 
della vita famigliare nella giurisprudenza degli organi di Strasburgo: alcune considerazioni, in DPCE, 2002, n. 
3, p. 1069 ss. 
103S. TONIOLO, Le unioni civili nel diritto internazionale privato, Milano, 2007, p. 35 ss.; G. FERRANDO, 
Matrimonio e famiglia: la giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo ed i suoi riflessi nel diritto 
interno, in G.IUDICA, G. ALPA (edited by), Costituzione europea e interpretazione della Costituzione italiana, 
Napoli, 2006, p. 131 ss.; F. BIONDI, L’unità familiare nella giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale e delle 
Corti europee (in tema di ricongiungimento familiare e di espulsione degli stranieri extracomunitari), in N. 
ZANON (edited by), Le Corti dell’integrazione europea e la Corte costituzionale italiana, Avvicinamenti, 
dialoghi, dissonanze, Napoli, 2006, p. 63 ss.; S. PATTI, La Famiglia, in S. PANUZIO (edited by), I diritti 
fondamentali e le Corti in Europa, Napoli, 2005, p. 493 ss. 
104European Courtof Human Rights, 5.1.2010, Jaremowicz c. Polond, no. 24023/03, www.hudoch.echr.coe.int  
105L. TOMASI, Famiglia e standard internazionali di protezione dei diritti fondamentali, con particolare 
riguardo alla CEDU, in Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo, 2010, n. 2, p. 427 ss. 
106European Courtof Human Rights, Grant c. United Kingdom,23.5.2006, no.32570/03, 
www.hudoch.echr.coe.int. 
107European Courtof Human Rights, H. c. Finland, 13.11.2012, no. 37359/09, www.hudoch.echr.coe.int. 
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the condition double registered partnership or Art. 14 - in conjunction with Art. 8 ECHR - 
considering the condition of the applicant is not homologous to that of any other person 
wishing to obtain a social security number of women. The Court of Strasbourg believes that 
the persistence of differences between registered partnerships and marriage does not integrate 
any breach of conventional dictation, recognizing the states ample discretion to determine 
and adjust the status resulting from the two forms of union.  
  
Conclusion 
 And 'therefore can be noted that there remains a discrimination against citizens of 
States in which there is no possibility of seeing any form of legally recognized union other 
than the bed or access to which is limited to partners of the opposite sex, which is why the 
judge Strasbourg are called to rule. A line of evolutionary interpretation has also been chosen 
by the Court of Justice that already in the pronunciation P. c. S. and Cornwall County 
Council108applies an interpretation of Directive 76/207109that extends rights to transsexuals 
also governed, in this case on the working conditions, the right to change his sex to have an 
essential right of the he Court of Justice of U.E. back ruling on Social Security, 110specifically 
the right to a survivor's pension for the surviving spouse of a heterosexual couple has become 
as a result of the sex of either spouse. The couple had decided to refer the matter to the Court 
of Appeal in Britain who chose to stay the action in reliance on the Court of Justice; the latter 
took the legislation of the United Kingdom, for the denial of the right to the surviving spouse, 
as opposed to Art. 141 EC and Directive 75/117/EC111.  
 In a preliminary Richards c. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions112, the Court of 
Justice interprets Art. 4, no. 1, of Directive 79/7113 on the implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment between men and women extending even to the person who chose the female 
gender pension reserved for women. The judges then condemn the UK “derogate from the 
principle of equal treatment between men and women” considered that such treatment, 
according to the pension scheme, affects the rights of transsexuals.  
 From these judgments shows the detected evolutionary trend followed by the Court of 
Human Rights and the European Court of Justice with respect to the interpretation of those 
provisions of the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the E.U.. Reading 
extensively practiced by the two European courts, was shared and applied by the Supreme 
Court in the judgment in question, considering that Art.4of Act 164 of 1982 and Art. 31 of 
d.l. n. 150/2011 violate the rights of marriages where one spouse chooses to change gender; 
from that moment, the protection offered to heterosexual couples fails behaving, 
consequently, the deprivation of a status already acquired that personal conditions the family 
as a whole. 
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